

MASARYK UNIVERSITY

Open Access Passenger Rail Services in Central Europe

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Introduction

• Open access passenger rail services have now been well established in Central Europe. They have been in operation in:

1) Austria on the Vienna–Salzburg line from 2011

2) the Czech Republic on the Prague–Ostrava line from 2011


3) Slovakia on the Žilina–Košice line from 2014.

- The aim of the paper is to compare the impacts of open access entries on the development of national railway markets. The comparison consists of three parts:
 - 1) the conditions for successful entry
 - 2) impacts on the market
 - 3) policy implications


Railway passenger market

| | Austria | Czech | Slovakia |
|--|---------|----------|----------|
| | | Republic | |
| Area (1000 km ²) | 84 | 79 | 49 |
| Population (million) | 8.5 | 10.5 | 5.4 |
| Length of railway lines (thous. km) | 5.1 | 9.5 | 3.6 |
| Share of electrified lines (%) | 70 | 34 | 44 |
| Passenger-killometres (billion) | 12.0 | 7.6 | 2.6 |
| Fare box revenue as % of total revenue | 56 | 50 | 33 |
| PSO as % of total services | 71 | 93 | 91 |


2011: FIRST ENTRIES IN CZ & AT




2013: 2nd ENTRY IN CZ




2014: 1st ENTRY IN SK




2014: 2nd ENTRY IN SK




2014: EXTENSION IN SK



2016: EXTENSION IN CZ



2017: CURRENT SITUATION



Entry barriers

| | Vertical structure | Long distance rail | Government attitude |
|-----------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
| Austria | Integrated | Commercial | Neutral |
| Czech Rep | Separated | PSO | Neutral |
| Slovakia | Separated | PSO | Hostile |

Access charges

| | InterCity | Suburban | Freight |
|------------|-----------|----------|---------|
| Austria | 4.2 | 2.0 | 3.4 |
| Czech Rep. | 1.2 | 0.6 | 3.4 |
| Slovakia | 1.8 | 1.6 | 2.8 |

EUR/trainkm

Business model

| | Entry | Rolling stock | Market leader |
|-----------|---------|---------------------|---------------|
| Austria | Head-on | New | OBB |
| Czech Rep | Head-on | Second-hand/ New | RegioJet |
| Slovakia | Niche | Second-hand/ New | ZSSK |

Effects

| | Frequency | Prices | Ridership | Market share |
|--|-----------|--------|-----------|--------------|
| | | | | newcomers |
| Austria 2011-2016 Vienna-Salzburg | +39% | -25% | +25% | 25% |
| Czech Rep. 2011-2016 Prague-Ostrava | +74% | -44% | +92% | 60% |
| Slovakia 2014 - 2016 Žilina - Košice | +120% | -50% | +34% | 40% |

Profits

| | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 |
|-------------|-------|-------|-------|------|
| WESTbahn | -23.5 | -14.5 | -10.3 | -5.4 |
| RegioJet | -2.8 | -3.4 | -1.6 | +1.5 |
| LEO Express | -2.9 | -5.9 | -5.1 | -3.1 |

mil. EUR

Anticompetitive behavior

| | Infrastructure Access Problems | Predatory pricing | PSO Competition |
|----------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| Austria | Major | Yes | No |
| Czech Republic | Significant | Yes | Significant |
| Slovakia | Small | Possible | Major |

Lessons learnt

- Smoother entry in vertically separated systems
- In smaller markets typically head on entry on principal rail line
- Dynamic and innovative business models of private operators
- Significant price decreases and ridership increases
- Significant market shares for the newcomers
- Economies of density diminished, unit costs probably higher
- Unclear operational efficiencies
- Financial losses (not only) for private operators

Policy challenges

- Infrastructure capacity around big cities
- Conflicts between OA and PSO services
- No tariff integration
- Predatory pricing
- The need for dedicated regulator

Conclusions

- Demand → positive impact of OA (innovations, marketing, frequency, quality, prices, ridership)
- Supply → questionable/negative impact of OA (rising unit costs, stagnating revenues, financial losses, cherry-picking, long term sustainability)
- Regulation → significant challenges (vertical structure, infra capacity, priority rights, operators disputes, predatory pricing, anticompetitive behaviour)